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Summary 
 
Using the method of generational accounting, this study describes the long-
term imbalance that arises from the existing structure of revenues and 
expenditures in Hungary’s budget. 
In the first step, we break the population down into generations (cohorts, 
age groups), and calculate the tax and contribution payments of average 
individuals across the various age groups, netting out the share they claim of 
public benefits and services. The balance of taxes and transfers (including in-
kind services) is the net age-profile. In the next step, we calculate the net 
contributions of the representative agent of each generation over their 
remaining lifetimes: these are the generational accounts.  
 If the balance of generational accounts shows a deficit, it must be charged 
against future generations. The indicator of generational imbalance measures 
the difference between the net contributions made by the new-born over their 
entire lives (their generational accounts) and the net contributions of future 
generations. If there is a significant difference between the net lifetime 
contributions of the new-born now and those of future generations, then the 
existing system of redistribution is not be sustainable in the long run. 
The figures for the generational imbalance between 1992 and 2001 show 
a strong correlation with government cycles. Since in election years the budget 
deficit soars and the age structure of the additional expenditure is particularly 
unhealthy, the value of the sustainability indicator shows up especially 
unfavourable in these years.  
The pension reform of 1998 significantly improved the long-term 
sustainability of the tax and transfer system. This improvement is mainly 
attributable to the reform of the pay-as-you-go system, and especially to the 
increase of the retirement age, and the application of the Swiss, half-wage, half-
price index rule. It must be added, though, that the calculations for the future 
are based on the increases of the official retirement age, and do not take into 
consideration the opportunity for early retirement.  
 After 1995, and especially since 1998, the indicator of generational 
imbalance has improved. This is due not only to a fall in the budget deficit, but 
also to a change in the age structure of public spending that encouraged long-
term sustainability.  
The indicator of generational imbalance is quite sensitive to assumptions 
made in the construction of age-profiles, so an international comparison is only 
sensible if the calculations were based on the same assumptions. Such data are 
available for 1995. By this comparison, the long-term sustainability of the 
Hungarian tax and transfer systems is especially unfavourable. However, it 
must be noted that since then significant reforms have been introduced in many 
countries. If we were to use the data from 2001 in the international comparison 
for 1995, Hungary would have an average result. 
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1. Introduction1 
 
Generational accounting measures the long-term sustainability of the tax-
transfer system. Its basic principle is to break net tax burdens down by 
generation, and project this distribution of burden across future years. Using 
some additional assumptions (including the rate of productivity growth and the 
discount rate) and a forecast on demography, we can determine the extent to 
which the current net tax burdens projected for the future will increase (or 
decrease) the tax burden on future generations so that the so-called 
intertemporal budget constraint is met. The intertemporal budget constraint is a 
zero-sum constraint; it states that any excess expenditure in the present must be 
paid for by someone; if no one else, then by generations to come. To put it more 
accurately: the present value of the future net taxes levied on generations both 
present and future must equal the present value of the current national debt 
and future government spending.  
The outcome of generational accounting is a vector of amounts of money. 
The individual entries of the vector show the present value of the difference 
between the tax payments expected from the representative agent of a 
particular generation over her remaining lifetime and the cash or in-kind 
services she will receive, assuming that no changes occur in the current 
redistribution system. 
The balances of the various generations are different: the balance of those 
over the retirement age is negative, because after the active age contributions 
decrease, while the amounts required to cover social security and health 
services are relatively high. The balance is only forward-looking and does not 
take account of past contributions from those who are currently retired. In 
contrast, the balance of active age groups is positive, i.e. their contributions 
exceed expected benefits. 
An important feature of generational accounting is the account of those 
born in the base year. Since they have no redistribution history, their balance 
                                                 
1 This paper is the English equivalent of the Hungarian original revised for the foreign reader. 
The research was conducted by TÁRKI on behalf of, and with the participation of, the 
Hungarian Ministry of Finance. We are also grateful for financial support from the National 
Research and Development Fund (NKFP 5/62/2002) and the National Science Fund (OTKA T 
046967). The authors of the background papers are Róbert Iván Gál (tax incidence, generational 
accounting), Márton Medgyesi (equivalence scales and breaking down household consumption 
into individual consumption, elementary age-profiles produced from the Household Budget 
Survey of the Central Statistical Office), Miklós Szabó (tax incidence), Árpád Törzsök 
(elementary age-profiles, generational accounts) and Tamás Révész (changes in government 
wealth). We acknowledge the contribution of Dóra Benedek, Gizella Csonka, Orsolya Lelkes 
and Ágota Scharle. In presenting the model of generational accounting, we deviate to some 
extent from the original version of Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991). We thank András 
Simonovits for his help in performing this simplification. 
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consists of an entire lifetime’s balance under the current tax-transfer system. On 
the other hand, the accounts of future generations represent a representative 
lifetime balance that covers accumulating deficits too, since the method 
assumes that taxes and benefits will change with future generations only, and 
existing generations will pay net taxes by the current net tax age-profile. Thus, 
by comparing these two entire lifetimes we can determine whether the existing 
system of redistribution can be sustained in the long term. 
Generational accounting was first published in a study by Auerbach, 
Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991). Theoretical, methodological and comparative 
studies that were prepared on the basis of this first study are compiled in a 
publication by Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999). The study by Kotlikoff 
and Raffelhüschen (1999) includes international comparisons, too. Special 
methodology summary and country reports were prepared for 12 EU member 
states on behalf of the Commission in Brussels (European Commission 1999).  
Generational accounts are constructed in the following way. As a first 
step, we determine the net tax profile as the difference between taxes and 
benefits2 that affect the particular generations in the base year, which we will 
refer to as t = 0. As each year is represented by a single number, the profile of 
tax balances for the base year is a vector of s components, where s denotes the 
number of individual cohorts, including newborns, i.e. 0 year-olds. In the 
theoretical model, s extends from 0 to D, the highest age. In practice, however, 
as there are fewer people in the higher age groups, cohorts for the older 
brackets are usually combined. As a next step, we calculate the values of this 
vector for each subsequent year – for 100 years according to the explanation 
below – by taking into consideration the assumptions on discount rates and 
productivity growth, the particular generation’s death profile, and future 
changes of the welfare system expected that have already been legislated.3 
Finally, in the s x 101 matrix (or projection matrix) we have just created, we 
track the individual year groups by moving diagonally (i.e. taking into account 
the aging of people), and make a sum of the present values of their net taxes 
across their entire remaining lifetime.  
We provide the results of our calculations below. In these, for the decade 
between 1992 and 2001, we prepared separate generational accounts, with each 
year considered as a base year. Therefore our results for 2001 are based on 
calculations in which 2001 is t = 0 (just as for 1992 in the calculations relevant 
for 1992), as opposed to t = 10. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 In order to facilitate an easy flow of the text, we will refer to all types of fees, levies, customs, 
contributions and taxes collectively as tax, and all benefits and allowances as benefits. 
3  In practice, these changes are limited to the pension system, for instance the gradual 
elimination of degressiveness of the pension formula, the phased increase in the retirement age, 
and the expected modification of the formula in 2013. 
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2. The model 
 
The basic criterion for generational accounting is that the combined net tax 
balances of future and already living age groups conform to the intertemporal 
constraint described below: 
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where 
Ms: is the present value of remaining net taxes for already living generations in t 
= 0; 
Mj: is the present value of net taxes of the future generation to be born in year j; 
s: is the generation variable: the age of a generation in t = 0; 
t: is the year variable; t = 0 is the base year; 
D: is the maximum age; 
Gt: is the government consumption in t = 0; 
u: is the relative discount factor, calculated as the rate of the productivity 
growth factor (1+g) and the interest factor (1+r); 
W: is net government wealth.  
 
The left side of the equation includes the net taxes of already living (Ms) 
and future (Mj) cohorts, i.e. the balance between their taxes and benefits or, 
more accurately, their present value calculated for t. As the welfare system 
extends ‘from the cradle to the grave’, s increases from zero to D, the latter 
denoting the oldest generation. In theory, we do not limit the year of birth of 
future generations, or j, and therefore all future years are considered. In 
practice, however, the time horizon of the calculation is 100 years, because – 
due to discounting – the impact of additional years is negligible. 
The first item on the right-hand side of the intertemporal constraint, Gtut, 
is the present value of government consumption arising in the base year and in 
subsequent years, and W represents the net government wealth, which – if 
negative – equals the net national debt. Net taxes (the M-items), i.e. the balance 
between public revenue and expenditure broken down for individuals, are, of 
course, part of the budget, much the same way as government consumption 
(the G-item). Gt represents public-spending items that, on the ‘private goods’–
‘public goods’ scale, are closer to the latter, and as such may not be broken 
down to individuals. In practice, the G-category is wider than it would be 
justified by the position of taxes and benefits on the private goods–public goods 
scale, because micro-data necessary for the breakdown are sometimes 
unavailable. 
On the left-hand side of (1) we separately summed up the net taxes of 
already living generations and future generations. The net tax balance of a 
generation for the entire remaining lifetime is calculated as: 
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for already living generations, and 
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for future generations, where 
Tk,k-s: is the net per capita tax of the cohort of age s in t = 0, when the generation 
is k years old;  
Tk,k+j: is the net per capita tax of a generation to be born j years after t = 0, when 
the generation is k years old; 
Pk,k-s: is the number of people of the cohort of age s in t = 0, still alive at the age 
of k; 
Pk,k+j: is the number of people of the cohort to be born j years after t = 0, still 
alive at the age of k;  
r: is the discount rate; 
k: is the age variable: the age of a generation; 
j: is the year variable; for each value where t > 0, t = j; 
ν: is the adjustment factor. 
 
Both (Ms) and (Mj) are vectors: they are vectors of net taxes of the various 
generations. The discounted net lifetime tax for a given generation’s remaining 
life is calculated from the actual per capita net taxes and the number of those 
alive in the generation in the given year. It is important to note that it is not 
redundant to calculate the per capita average for generation of age k, and 
subsequently multiply it by the number of individuals of the generation who 
survived until the age of k. The net per capita taxes of the k year-old are not 
determined by dividing and then re-multiplying the macro-values of the 
relevant year – as this indeed would not make sense – but rather they are 
computed from the balance of the previous year of the k+1 year-old, by 
applying the relative discount factor. This way we use the vector of net per 
capita taxes of the base year across the entire calculation.  
In formula (3) we use the ν adjustment factor as well. We had to 
introduce this because Mj/ν only shows how much net taxes should be paid by 
the representative agent of the generation born in j during her entire lifetime if 
demographic trends followed the forecasts. However, future generations must 
adjust to the intertemporal budget constraint, i.e. they must pay the 
accumulated deficits, or, in a favourable scenario, they can receive the surplus. 
Therefore, their net lifetime tax must be corrected by the ν adjustment factor.  
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In formulae (2) and (3) we used Tk,t to indicate, in general, the net tax 
relevant in a given year (for already living generations the expression is Tk,k-s, 
while for future cohorts the expression Tk,k+j applies). Net tax is made up of 
contributions (C) and benefits (B). The definitions of Tk,t,Ck,t and Bk,t are: 
    tktktk BCT ,,, −=     (4a) 
    )1(1,, gCC tktk += −     (4b) 
    )1(1,, gBB tktk += −     (4c) 
where 
Tk,t: is net tax per capita of the k year-old in year t; 
Ck,t: is total tax per capita of the k year-old in year t; 
Bk,t: is total benefits per capita of the k year-old in year t. 
 
Taxes per capita in year t were computed of only two inputs: the 
contributions of the preceding cohort in the previous year and productivity 
growth. This implies the tacit assumption that the average tax of those who die 
between year t-1 and t equals the average tax for the entire generation. This is 
probably not the case: life expectancy actually correlates with income and thus 
with taxes paid. However, in the absence of reliable external estimates for 
Hungary, we cannot take that relationship into account. 
As a last step, following the projection of the balance in the base year and 
the accumulation of the balances for the various generations, we determine the 
generations’ net per capita taxes for the remaining lifetime of each cohort. For 
already living generations, this balance is calculated as: 
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While in the case of future generations the formula is: 
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where: 
Ns: is the generational account of generations already alive; 
N: is the average generational account of future generations. 
 
The first step in determining the per capita values is to calculate the size 
of the generation. For generations already alive, the actual size of the generation 
in the base year will be used. In other words, the generational account shows 
what the net position will be of a representative member of a particular 
generation vis-à-vis the general government budget across the remaining 
lifetime. The generational account is positive if the given generation is a net 
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contributor and negative if the contributions of the cohort fall short of the 
benefits they receive.  
The generational accounts for future generations can be constructed in 
two steps. In the first step, we define the size of a generation – of every 
generation – as the size of the generation at zero years of age. We use these 
figures to project net lifetime taxes. From the aggregated net contributions 
calculated in this way and adjusted by ν, we select an average generational 
account, which is the same for all future generations. 
 
3. Constructing generational accounts  
3.1 Net tax profiles  
 
In the equation of the intertemporal budget constraint, the present value of 
remaining net taxes of already living and future generations is determined by 
the net tax profile of the base year. In the background papers of this study we 
provide a detailed description of constructing net tax profiles. Here, we limit 
ourselves to give a list of the elementary tax age-profiles we have constructed, 
to describe briefly the tax incidence assumptions applied, and to summarise the 
total net tax profile for 2001. 
 
3.1.1 Elementary tax age-profiles 
 
As mentioned before, the revenue side includes several items that were 
disregarded in the construction of the generational tax profiles. Items where the 
contributor can be identified, in principle at least, are among taxes. Taxes make 
up 80 to 90 percent of consolidated revenue in the years under review, and their 
weight is slowly increasing. As for the number of balance sheet entries, this 
group includes a wide variety of revenue categories, but the better part of taxes 
is made up of only a handful of them. In Table 1 we present the level of detail 
we used for revenues, and also give the data sources we had to break down the 
various entries to individual contributors. In Table 2 we present the 
expenditure side in a similar structure, showing data sources applied in 
constructing the elementary age-profiles.  
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Table 1: Revenue items of the general government and data sources for constructing of elementary age-profiles  
Code Description Data source 
I.1.1.1.1 Personal income tax (PIT) From PIT sample 
I.1.1.1.2 Corporate taxes From PIT sample 
I.1.1.1.3.1 Tax from separately taxed income Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.1.3.2 Contributions due to special events Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.1.3.3 Other income taxes (not classified) Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.2.1.1 Employee contribution From PIT sample 
I.1.1.2.1.2 Employee pension and health insurance contribution From PIT sample 
I.1.1.2.2.1 Social security contribution From PIT sample 
I.1.1.2.2.2 Employer contribution From PIT sample 
I.1.1.2.2.3 Health contribution From PIT sample 
I.1.1.2.2.4 Sick-leave contribution Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.2.3.1.1 Contributions paid by private entrepreneurs  From PIT sample 
I.1.1.2.3.1.2 Contributions from those paying by special agreement Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.2.3.1.3 Health contribution paid by private entity Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.2.3.1.4 Accident contribution Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.2.3.2 Other contributions from state budget From PIT sample 
I.1.1.2.3.3 Other contributions (not split) Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.3.1 Vocational training contribution Allocated evenly for those with income from employment 
I.1.1.3.2 Rehabilitation contribution Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.3.3 Communal tax related to employees Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.4.1 Construction tax Allocated as local business tax  
I.1.1.4.2 Tourism tax for buildings Allocated as local business tax  
I.1.1.4.3 Communal tax for private entities Allocated as local business tax  
I.1.1.4.4 Land tax Allocated as local business tax  
I.1.1.4.5 Inheritance tax Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.4.6 Gift tax Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.4.7 Duty on transfer or acquisition of property Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.4.8 Duty on transfer of real estate  Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.4.9 Duty on transfer of vehicles  Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
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I.1.1.5.1 VAT From HBS 
I.1.1.5.2.1 Consumption tax on goods and services From HBS 
I.1.1.5.2.2 Excise tax From HBS 
I.1.1.5.3 Profit from financial monopolies Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.5.4.1 Taxes on other services Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.5.4.2 Taxes on use of goods and services, local business tax Allocated as corporate taxes 
I.1.1.5.4.3.1 Tax on domestic vehicles From HBS 
I.1.1.5.4.3.2 Tax on foreign vehicles G-item 
I.1.1.5.4.3.3 Levies on excess weight of vehicles From HBS 
I.1.1.5.4.4.1 Road fund contribution From HBS 
I.1.1.5.4.4.2 Environmental protection product fees Partly broken down from HBS 
I.1.1.5.4.4.3 Cultural contribution Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.5.4.4.4 Tourism tax (based on nights spent) Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.5.4.4.5 Tourism contribution Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.5.4.4.6 Revenues from brandy making monopoly From HBS 
I.1.1.5.4.4.8 Other taxes on goods and services Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.6.1 Customs levies Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.6.2 Other import fees Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.7.1 Other taxes Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.7.2.1 Fees due to use of environment Broken down as the environmental protection product fees 
I.1.1.7.2.2 Nuclear contribution G-item 
I.1.1.7.2.3 Other tax-type revenues Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
I.1.1.8 Tax and contributions penalties, late payment penalty, self-revision penalty Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
Notes: 
The codes in the first column are taken from the Ministry of Finance guideline Economic Revenue Categories (Bevételek közgazdasági besorolása). 
G-item: an item where a breakdown to individual tax payers is not feasible, not only due to lack of input, but also for conceptual reasons. 
PIT: personal income tax; HBS: Household Budget Survey of the Central Statistical Office. 
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Table 2: Expenditure items of the general government and data sources for constructing of elementary age-profiles 
Function Description Data source 
F01 General public services G-item 
F02 Defence G-item 
F03 Police and public security G-item 
F04 Training activities and services Allocated uniformly for all participants 
F05 Health care From the sample of records  
F06.a Sick leave pay, maternity and temporary disability benefits From HBS 
F06.b Pensions From the sample of records 
F06.c Other social security and social benefits  Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F06.d Unemployment benefit From HBS 
F06.e Family allowances and child care benefits From HBS 
F06.f Other social benefits Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F06.g Social and welfare services  Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F07.1 Other housing and communal services (not split) Allocated uniformly for all participants 
F07.2 Individual housing benefits Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F07.3 Other housing services Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F07.4 Public housing services Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F07.5 Communal development  Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F07.6 Administration of housing affairs and services  Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F07.7 Local water networks and protection of water quality Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F07.8 City and village management services Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F08.a Sports and leisure activities and services Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F08.b Cultural activities and services G-item 
F08.c Broadcasting and publishing activities and services Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F08.d Religious activities G-item 
F08.e Political parties G-item 
F08.f Other community and cultural activities Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F09 Fuel and energy provision G-item 
F10 Land, forest, fishery and game management  G-item 
F11 Mining and industry Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F12 Transport and telecommunications services Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
F13.a Multi-purpose development activities and services Allocated to G-items due to lack of input 
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F13.b Other management activities and services G-item 
F14 Environmental protection G-item 
F15 Management of national debt G-item 
F16 Items not allocated to main categories G-item 
Notes: 
The function codes shown in the first cell of each line are taken from the methodology manual of the Ministry of Finance The Functional Classification of the 
General Government Budget (Az államháztartás funkcionális rendje MS-4/1998). 
G-item: an item where a breakdown to individual beneficiaries is not feasible, not only due to lack of input, but also for conceptual reasons. 
HBS: Household Budget Survey of the Central Statistical Office. 
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3.1.2 Tax incidence considerations 
 
The shape of the net tax age-profile, and consequently the final result of 
generational accounting, is significantly influenced by the incidence 
assumptions we use about the various tax categories. A basic finding in the 
theory of tax incidence is that those who are required to pay tax by law (legal 
incidence) are not necessarily the same people who will eventually pay the tax, 
i.e. whose well-being will decrease as a result of paying taxes (economic 
incidence). This is because, taxation changes the behaviour of actors and prices 
will reach new equilibriums. For instance, when a new tax is introduced, actors 
cut back their consumption or adjust their savings decisions. In other words, 
they try to devolve the tax burden to others. The extent to which they can do 
that depends on the market structure and their market position. The same can 
also occur on the expenditure side, especially in the case of cash payments. This 
latter could be termed ‘skimming’.  
 
Table 3: Tax incidence conventions of major research centres 
 JCT OTA CBO EUGA 
Personal income 
tax 
Those required to 
pay 
Those required to 
pay  
Those required to 
pay 
Those required to 
pay 
Capital gains tax Capital owners    
Corporate income 
tax 
Corporate capital 
owners 
By capital gains 
income  
All capital owners 
(not only 
corporate capital 
owners) 
All capital owners 
(not only 
corporate capital 
owners) 
Social security 
contribution 
(employee’s and 
employer’s) 
Employees Employees  Employees Employees 
Sales taxes for 
consumers 
Sales tax in its 
broad sense is 
defined as the tax 
on equivalent 
wage and the tax 
on capital  
In proportion to 
consumption and 
by income from 
employment and 
capital gains 
Among 
consumers in 
proportion to the 
consumption of 
taxed commodity 
Among 
consumers in 
proportion to the 
consumption of 
taxed commodity 
Sales tax for 
corporations 
 
- 
In proportion to 
income from 
capital and work  
Among 
consumers in 
proportion to 
their total 
consumption  
Among 
consumers in 
proportion to 
their total 
consumption 
Source: JCT (1993), OTA (1999), CBO (2001) and European Commission (1999).  
 
 
In Table 3 we present the tax incidence conventions developed by four 
major professional bodies. These bodies are: the Joint Committee on Taxation 
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(JCT) which comprises representatives delegated by the two houses of the US 
Legislature; the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which works under the 
supervision of the US Congress; and the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) at the US 
Treasury Department. We found no corresponding bodies in Europe. However, 
in 1999, a benchmark study on generational accounting was prepared on behalf 
of the European Commission (European Commission 1999), and as part of this 
project a convention was established (below we will refer to that as EUGA).  
In our study, we usually use the EUGA convention as a guideline, unless 
stated otherwise. One reason for this choice is that the generational accounts 
that will be the output of our exercise are intended for use in European 
benchmarking. The other reason is that, from a professional perspective too, the 
EUGA convention is close to the methodology used in this project. The tax 
incidence conventions used in the US focus primarily on the distribution of tax 
burden by income brackets, while in constructing generational accounts 
incidence is examined by age. These two approaches are somewhat different in 
terms of methodology. For instance, a tax incidence study performed by income 
does not require the separation of household consumption into individual 
consumptions, while this breakdown is necessary in a study by age. Members 
of a household typically have the same income level, but their ages are 
different.  
However, tax incidence by age poses several problems too, such as taxes 
on and transfers for raising children. Whose consumption is in fact burdened by 
taxes on commodities consumed by children: that of the child or the parent? 
Who is the beneficiary of cash family benefits or housing subsidies subject to 
the number of children of the family: the child, as the actual basis for eligibility, 
or the parent, as the recipient of the subsidy? If the beneficiary is the child, i.e. 
the source of the eligibility, then by the same token, whose account should be 
credited for a survivor’s pension: that of the person who has acquired the right 
to the benefit (who is no longer aging together with the beneficiary, therefore 
making it impossible to tell the age of the eligible person, for instance in the 
case of a widow’s pension that has been paid for a number of years) or that of 
the recipient, i.e. the survivor? Based on these examples, we may conclude that 
the existing convention may not be the ultimate solution.  
 
3.1.3 The net tax age-profile in 2001 
 
The curve of the age-profile of revenues does not start exactly in the origin, 
because we have credited tax on the consumption of newborns, too (VAT and 
excise tax). In 2001, the tax burden charged against newborns was more than 
140 euros. Growth is steady at the beginning of the curve due to increasing 
consumption as children grow older. Members of the generation between 15 
and 18 bear more than 630 euros of tax burden on average, with VAT 
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representing as much as two-thirds of the amount. This generation is already 
partially burdened by excise duty on tobacco and alcohol. 
 
Figure 1: The aggregate revenue age-profile, 2001 
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The next age group, from 19 to 24, already includes significant amounts 
of income from employment, and thus the tax burden is higher, too: people of 
this generation had a tax burden of more than 1,580 euros per capita in 2001. 
Here, the curve is steep, because the older a generation, the higher its 
employment rate. Then the curve plateaus somewhat, since the 25 to 29 year-
old have almost the same employment rate as people between 30 and 35, except 
they earn a little less. In terms of consumption tax, there is no significant 
difference between these two groups. 
The next section worth of attention on the curve is its sloping part. The 
turning point in the curve is at the cohorts of 45 to 49. This cohort pays the 
highest amount, 3,800 euros on average. The 50 to 54 year-old pay somewhat 
less, and the generation of 55 to 59 only pays 2,740 euros per capita. The main 
reason is declining participation in the labour market in this age group, despite 
the retirement age rising for women to 58 years in 2000.  
While the greater part of revenue is related to income from employment, 
the purpose and categories – and thus the profiles – of public spending vary 
greatly. 
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Newborns are recipients of substantial public spending: their account is 
credited by nearly 490 euros for health services. Some in the generation of 1 to 5 
already use the education system, because they go to kindergarten, and almost 
100 percent of primary school age children are recipients of expenditure on the 
public education system. The generation of 19 to 24 use the rather expensive 
higher education, and some of them already receive family benefits. Public 
benefits received by the working-age population decrease as people get older, 
and they surge again just before retirement. Among the older generations, those 
over 80 receive 2,840 euros per capita in social security and health care. 
Benefits to primary school-age children and those of age 19 to 24 
represent the same order of magnitude in the budget: 1,370 euros and 1,240 
euros per capita, respectively. Of course, this congruence vanishes if, instead of 
the parents’ accounts, we credit the children’s accounts with family benefits and 
housing assistance, in line with the alternative incidence concept mentioned 
before. The amounts spent on these younger cohorts are less than half what the 
state spends on people over 80 – the pension is often a pensioner’s sole source 
of income, and health expenses on the oldest age group is also significant. 
Another comparison: public spending on newborns is lower than that on the 
‘cheapest’ adult generation, i.e. those of age 45 to 49 (about 490 euros and about 
630 euros, respectively). 
 
Figure 2: The aggregate expenditure age-profile, 2001 
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The total of aggregate balances calculated cohorts is the net tax profile. 
For each generation, we deducted the expenditure relevant to the cohort from 
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the revenue from that generation. In the 2001 account of newborns, credits for 
spending exceeded debits for tax revenue by 345 euro. Almost the entire 
difference stems from the gap between the VAT and duty levied on the 
consumption of newborns and the health spending they account for. At the 
same time, we charged the newborn-related part of family benefits against 
parents (and charged survivor benefits against surviving relatives).  
The youngest net contributor is the 19 to 24 year old cohort. Their 
contributions exceed the benefits they receive by 346 euros. We need to note 
again that expenditures on pure public goods (government consumption) are 
not included in this balance. The highest net contribution comes from the 
generation between 45 and 49. Not only are they the largest contributors, but 
they receive the lowest spending from the budget, too. If we also consider that 
this was the largest age group in 2001, we may find that the retirement of this 
generation will place a significant burden on the tax-transfer system. 
The other intersection point reveals the oldest generation whose 
contributions still exceed benefits. According to the figure, the generation of 60 
to 64 is already below this intersection point; that is to say, they are net 
recipients under the redistribution regime of 2001. The moderate downward 
slope of the curve shows that people become inactive at different ages. If 
everybody worked until they reached retirement age, the fall in the curve 
would be steeper.  
Finally, the lowest point in the curve belongs to those over 80, whose net 
contribution per capita is 2,420 euros. 
 
Figure 3: The aggregate net tax profile, 2001 
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3.2 Net tax profiles and the balance of the general government 
budget  
3.2.1 Balance entries and net tax profiles 
 
The net tax age-profiles are made up of elementary age-profiles such as the 
profiles of the personal income tax, taxes on consumption and social security. In 
the construction of elementary age-profiles, we examined the various revenue 
and expenditure entries of the budget balance separately. The elementary age-
profile is an entry in the budget balance broken down by age and averaged for 
the representative member of a cohort. Accordingly, the contribution and 
benefit profiles produced by the combination of elementary age-profiles 
correspond to the totals of the revenue and expenditure side of the budget 
balance, and thus the elements of these two age-profiles multiplied by the 
number of members in the respective age group will equal the totals of revenue 
and expenditure in the budget balance, or more precisely, the part that remains 
of these totals after the deduction of G-items, or government consumption. 
Thus, conceptually, the net tax age-profile is related to the budget deficit. The 
net tax age-profile is a part of the deficit, cleared of G-items both on the revenue 
and expenditure sides, broken down and averaged for cohorts. 
 
3.2.2 Consolidation 
 
During the consolidation of the budget balance, items that represent transfers 
among various branches of the general government are offset against each 
other. Consolidation is practically the netting of fund transfers occurring 
between sub-systems of the general government. As a result, the amount of the 
deficit remains unchanged, because all eliminated items are simultaneously 
revenue and expenditure; yet the totals will decrease due to netting, and that, in 
turn, will increase the proportion of the deficit. Consolidation, therefore, 
prevents double counting of the same item and eliminates an opportunity for 
manipulating the deficit. Double counting can cause problems, especially in 
interpreting the functional balance, because some public services are financed 
directly by the government budget, while other functions receive funding 
through sub-systems of the general government. For instance, primary 
education is financed by the government through local municipalities. In an 
unconsolidated balance, this item is registered more than once. Higher 
education, however, is funded directly making this item registered only once in 
an unconsolidated balance. Consequently, an unconsolidated balance does not 
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provide appropriate ratios of functional expenditure, and offers a distorted 
picture when projected across the various generations. These considerations 
clearly justify the use of a consolidated balance. 
However, the difference between M-items, traceable back to the level of 
individuals, and G-items, embodying government consumption (or, less 
frequently, revenue) in equation (1) does not correspond to the variation that 
arises on consolidation. There are several entries in the balance that can be 
matched with payers, despite the fact they represent transfers between sectors 
of the general government, and as such are eliminated on consolidation. For 
instance, social security contributions paid by employers are considered by 
every known convention of tax incidence analysis to be a tax borne by the 
employee. That is to say, in equation (1) they are treated as M-items ready for 
breakdown to individuals, regardless of whether the contributions are paid by 
the government or municipalities in their capacity as employers. Social security 
contributions paid by employers are recognised as household income in the 
system of national accounts, too, regardless of whether the employer in 
question is public or private.  
Accordingly, the balance suitable for the purpose of generational 
accounting is a partially consolidated one, where both sides of the consolidated 
balance are completed by five types of contributions paid to social security from 
within the general government. 4  This partial consolidation means on the 
revenue side that all contributions count irrespective of those who paid worked 
for a private business or the government. On the expenditure side, it means that 
the price of public services has to include social security contributions paid by 
those who provided these services. Should these services be outsourced, 
contributions would be naturally recognised among the costs. 
Partial consolidation enables us to use more accurate net tax profiles, 
because full consolidation, neglecting much of the contributions paid to social 
security, considerably re-weights the net tax age-profiles estimated from the 
micro-samples. Also, the so-called breakdown ratio improves, too, i.e. the ratio 
between items that can be allocated to contributors or recipients in practice, and 
items where such allocation exists in principle; we will return to this later. 
Partial consolidation leaves the budget deficit unchanged, yet the proportion of 
the deficit will shrink, and thus the method will make public spending appear 
larger compared to GDP than a fully consolidated balance. In generational 
accounting, however, what counts is the amount of the deficit, rather than its 
proportion to the totals. The resulting generational imbalance indicator is 
                                                 
4  These items are: revenue from social security contributions from within the general 
government, revenue from employer contributions from within the general government, health 
contributions from within the general government, sick-pay contributions from within the  
general government, and other contributions from within the general government. In this list  of 
budget entries “social security contribution” is used in a narrower sense than in the main text, 
where all of them would fall under the name of social security contributions. 
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compared to household categories, such as net income, rather than to categories 
of the general government budget.  
On the ground of this, for the purposes of the research we chose to use a 
partially consolidated balance in which social security contributions paid by 
and on behalf of civil servants are not consolidated. We will describe this 
partially consolidated balance for 2001 in detail in Table 4. 
 
3.3 Net taxes and government consumption 
3.3.1 The borderline between M and G-items of the intertemporal budget 
constraint  
 
M-items of the intertemporal budget constraint of generational accounting are 
derived from the net tax profile of the base year, i.e. they are made up of 
revenue and expenditure items where the payer or beneficiary can be identified. 
In contrast, G-items are revenue that may not, for conceptual reasons, be linked 
to a single person, and expenditure that finances pure public goods. 
On the revenue side, taxes are made up of M-items (with a few 
exceptions, such as tax on foreign vehicles). Important G-items include non-tax 
type revenues, and transfers received for operational purposes. Non-tax type 
revenues include non-refundable service fees; these typically arise when 
someone uses a public service that carries a charge, e.g. payment for a road toll 
or for a certified copy at a land registry office. The payers of such fees can be 
identified in theory, but in such instances the state is not performing its function 
of redistribution; rather it is providing a service of a commercial nature. These 
revenues finance private goods rather than public goods, and the transactions 
are carried out in such a way that the payer receives the goods forthwith upon 
payment. The group titled ‘transfers received for operational purposes’ includes 
non-refundable revenues such as transfers received from other governments or 
international organisations, and primary and secondary current transfers 
within the budget. Again, these do not qualify as redistribution among citizens. 
Similarly, government revenues from capital transactions cannot be tied to 
individuals, and neither can be loans refunded and received.  
There are public dues where a breakdown to individuals is feasible in 
theory, yet we classify them among items of government consumption, because 
we are unable to determine a relevant age distribution. Such ‘obligated G-items 
include, for instance, government revenue from customs and customs-type 
payments, and stamp-duty fees. 
On the expenditure side, the difference between G and M items is more 
tangible: G-items include expenditure on pure public goods, while M-items are 
closer to private goods. Pure public goods include government operational 
functions, public administration, defence, public security, public health (i.e. a 
small part of health-related public spending such as epidemiology), much of 
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road and rail transport, telecommunications and environmental protection. We 
also classify as public goods, albeit somewhat less obviously, cultural, religious 
and political activities, along with expenditure on fuel and energy, and 
spending on land, forest, fishery and game management. Amounts in the latter 
group are mainly spent on the protection of forests and the natural 
environment, i.e. on projects where the specific beneficiaries cannot be 
identified. 
 
Table 4: Revenues and expenditures of the general government for generational 
accounting, in 2001, ‘000,000 euros 
REVENUE EXPENDITURE 
Current revenues and current 
transfers 
25,337 General public services 2,940 
Total dues 22,588 Defence 754 
Income taxes  5,721 Police and public security 1,446 
Social security, employee and 
employer contributions 
7,393 Education 
 
3,364 
Taxes on wages and employment 76 Health care 2,637 
Property taxes 414 Social security, social services 8,266 
Taxes on products and services  8,236 Housing and communal services 835 
Customs and customs-type 
charges 
487 Leisure, cultural and religious 
activities and services 
879 
Other taxes 260 Environmental protection 560 
Other current revenues and 
current transfers 
2,749 Fuel and energy provision 12 
Revenue from capital transactions 
and capital grants 
775 Land, forest, fishery and game 
management 
1,041 
Loans refunded and received 215 Mining and industry 157 
Items not classified in other 
categories 
28 Transport and telecommunications 1,134 
   Other economic activities and services 848 
   National debt management 2,802 
   Items not classified in other categories 590 
TOTAL REVENUE 26,355 TOTAL EXPENDITURE 28,041 
Of which:  Of which:  
items that can be broken down to 
individuals (M-item) 
22,222 items that can be broken down to 
individuals (M-item) 
16,533 
government consumption (G-item) 4,132 government consumption (G-item) 11,507 
Source: ÁHIR databases. 
Note: Totals exclude financing expenditure and revenue. The entries of the balance-sheet are derived 
from the entries of the consolidated balance by adding to both sides the social security contributions 
transferred within the general government (social security contribution revenue from within the 
general government, revenue from employer contributions from within the general government, 
revenue from health contributions from within the general government, sick-pay contributions from 
within the general government, and other contributions from within the general government). This 
operation affects one entry on the revenue side and multiple entries on the expenditure side. 
M-items: entries not carrying pure public goods, G-items: entries carrying pure public goods.  
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We also consider expenditure on the management of the national debt to 
be a G-item, along with other items not broken down and allocated to any 
major category, as no individual beneficiary may be linked to such 
expenditures. 
Since it does not finance public goods, expenditure on education and 
health, along with social security and welfare services (including family 
benefits and housing subsidies) may be linked to beneficiaries. We considered 
amounts spent on mining and industry to be items that finance private goods, 
because the better part of these is spent on job retention. Most expenditure on 
multiple-purpose development activities and services, and other economic 
activities and services, supports primarily private businesses, and thus we do 
not classify it as a G-item. However, we found no suitable method to break this 
down into age categories. In many cases, the detailed classification of the main 
expenditure groups makes the link between expenditure entries and categories 
fairly clear, yet the budget data actually necessary for the breakdown are not 
available, which makes the split between G and M items more indistinct. 
On the expenditure side, there are quite a few items that should be 
allocated to beneficiaries in theory, as they do not finance public goods, yet we 
do not have a firm starting point to perform the allocation. Within social 
security benefits, such items include sick pay or other social support and 
benefits. Among expenditures on entertainment, cultural and religious activities 
and services, we considered sports, broadcasting and publishing to be M-items 
in principle, but again no data sources were available to link them to 
beneficiaries. 
Equations (1) to (4) show that, during the projection, G-items increase 
exponentially of the power to u. In contrast, apart from u, M-items are impacted 
by the age distribution, too. In an aging population, future M-balances decrease 
compared to G-balances, because aging increases expenditure and reduces 
revenue. The generational imbalance is largely attributable to this phenomenon. 
Therefore, the obligated reclassification of some M-items into the group of G-
items will artificially alter the future imbalance. 
In theory, M-items of unknown distribution could also be classified not 
as G-items, but as M-items evenly distributed. If items reclassified from G into 
M in this way, include more expenditure than revenue, i.e. if, due to the 
reclassification, both the G-balance and the M-balance are reduced in the base 
year, in an aging population this reclassification will reduce the long-term 
imbalance. This must be taken into account when interpreting the results or 
when performing international comparisons. Due to the varying statistical 
capacities of different countries, the proportion of budget items involuntarily 
classified as G-items is not necessarily the same. Thus the reliability of the 
various calculations is significantly affected by the breakdown ratio, i.e. by the 
ratio between items that can be allocated to contributors or recipients in 
practice, and items that should be allocated to individuals in principle. The 
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higher the breakdown ratio, the fewer entries must be involuntarily handled as 
G-items.  
 
3.3.2 Breakdown ratios 
 
A good way to measure the reliability of net tax profiles is by breakdown ratios. 
From the totals of revenue and expenditure we deduct the G-items that for 
conceptual reasons should not be broken down to individuals. Such items, for 
instance, include, on the revenue side, income from capital transactions and 
capital grants, or loans refunded and received; and, on the expenditure side, 
general public spending or expenditure on defence. In the next step, we 
compare the remaining revenue and expenditure with the sum of items where 
we managed to create age-profiles in one way or the other. 
As Table 5 shows, the breakdown ratios are high and show an improving 
trend. On the contribution side, this improvement is partly attributable to a 
steady decline in the weight of non-allocated taxes, such as customs or penalties 
for delay. Another driver is that separately taxed income is by now included in 
the personal income tax declaration form, and thus can be broken down for 
individuals. Between 85 and 95 percent of the amount that in principle should 
be allocated were in fact broken down to individual taxpayers. Naturally, on 
the expenditure side, such a high rate of allocation cannot be expected. Between 
70 and 78 percent of public expenditure that do not finance public goods was 
allocated, which covers 43 to 47 percent of total expenditure.  
 
Table 5: Breakdown ratios (1992-2001) 
Revenues Expenditures 
M-items 
total 
M-items 
allocated  
M-items 
total 
M-items 
allocated  
 
Billion euros 
Breakdown 
ratio (%) 
 
Million euros 
Breakdown 
ratio (%) 
 
1992 13.0 11.4 88 11.9 8.3  70 
1993 14.9 13.0 87 13.5 9.8  73 
1994 15.1 13.2 88 13.9 10.4  75 
1995 14.3 12.2 85 11.5 8.6  75 
1996 14.2 12.5 88 11.0 8.4  77 
1997 15.8 14.2 90 11.9 9.3  78 
1998 16.0 14.8 92 12.6 9.8  78 
1999 17.4 16.3 94 13.4 10.3  77 
2000 19.6 18.3 93 14.6 11.1  76 
2001 22.2 21.0 95 16.5 12.7  77 
Note: M-items total: revenues or expenditures the sources or beneficiaries of which can, in 
principle, be identified.  M-items allocated: revenues or expenditures the sources or beneficiaries 
of which could have been identified in practice. 
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3.4 Government wealth 
 
Government wealth is on the right side of the first equation of generational 
accounting, the intertemporal budget constraint. It is denoted by W, in line with 
the conventions. Table 6 shows the size of and the changes in, this wealth.  
 
3.5. Predictions 
 
Generational accounting is not used for predictive purposes. Generational 
accounts are usually not analysed on their own. Typically, the accounts of 
newborns are compared with those of future generations; or – less often – the 
age-profiles of generational accounts in different countries are analysed; or, as a 
third alternative, the age-profiles under review are examined under various 
institutional alternatives, e.g. different reform scenarios. Because of this, users 
of the method prefer to limit the role of forecasts to a minimum, since the 
objective is not to tell what is going to happen in the future, but rather to 
describe the current situation under the existing conditions including the long-
term impacts.  
We only use demographic forecasts, assumptions on the rate of long-
term economic growth, and apply an appropriate discount rate. Population 
figures are taken from a model prepared by the Institute of Demography of the 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) in 2003, which provides data up to 2050. We 
complemented this forecast with data covering the 1990s, using the CSO’s 
retrospective population adjustments made after the census of 2001. Since we 
had to cover a longer time period, for the years after 2050 we assumed that the 
structure of the population would not change from that of 2050. Similar 
solutions are used in generational accounting in the UK and in Canada. For the 
purposes of generational accounting, future generations are handled as a single 
age group. 
In equation (1) we used a relative discount factor (u), which already 
includes an expansion element, the average annual productivity growth rate (g), 
and the discount rate itself (r). Since the amount of future welfare benefits is less 
certain than yields of long-term government securities, in determining the 
discount rate we must use an interest rate that is higher than the real interest 
rate of government securities. At the same time, the benefits in question are less 
volatile than the real yield on capital, which justifies using a value between the 
interest rate of government securities and the capital gain achievable in the 
private sector. In order to facilitate international comparisons, we set the 
economic growth rate at 1.5 percent and the discount rate at 5 percent. The 
same values were used in the research on the generational accounting of 17 
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countries (Auerbach, Leibfritz and Kotlikoff 1999), and in the country reports of 
the 12 EU member states (European Commission 1999). 
 
Table 6: The financial wealth of the general government (S.13) (stocks), billion euros 
Description 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Government (S.1311) 
Financial assets 33.2  33.9  26.7  19.1  14.7  13.4  11.3  12.4  12.1  11.9  11.3  
1 Cash and deposits 2.6  3.5  2.8  3.5  2.1  1.6  0.8  1.5  1.1  1.8  0.5  
2 Non-share securities 0.1  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2  1.1  1.1  1.2  0.6  
3 Credits and loans 3.9  3.9  2.5  2.2  1.9  2.2  2.0  1.7  1.6  1.3  1.7  
3a Loans to enterprises 2.5  2.6  1.1  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.2  
4 Property 24.7  23.9  19.3  11.5  9.1  7.5  6.5  6.0  6.1  5.1  5.8  
5 Other receivables 1.9  2.1  1.9  1.8  1.6  2.0  1.8  2.1  2.2  2.4  2.8  
Liabilities 23.4  31.1  32.4  30.8  28.0  27.9  27.8  30.5  30.9  34.9  41.9  
6 Deposits 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
7 Non-share securities 4.8  10.1  11.7  10.9  14.1  14.1  14.7  19.1  20.9  25.3  32.3  
8 Credits and loans 18.2  20.5  19.9  19.3  13.3  13.1  12.4  10.6  9.1  7.5  8.1  
9 Other payables 0.5  0.6  0.8  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.8  2.1  1.5  
Net financial wealth 9.8  2.8  -5.7  -11.6  -13.3  -14.5  -16.5  -18.1  -18.8  -23.0  -30.5  
Social Security funds (S.1314) 
Financial assets 0.8  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.9  1.2  1.0  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  
1 Cash and deposits 0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
2 Non-share securities 0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
3 Credit and loans 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
4 Property 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.5  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
5 Other receivables 0.5  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.9  
Liabilities 0.2  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.6  
6 Credits and loans 0.2  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.5  0.2  0.5  
7 Other payables 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  
Net financial wealth 0.5  0.5  0.4  0.1  0.5  0.8  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.3  
Local government (S.1313) 
Financial assets 3.6  4.5  4.8  3.9  4.6  4.7  4.0  3.9  3.9  4.3  4.5  
1 Cash and deposits 0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.8  0.9  
2 Non-share securities 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.3  
3 Credits and loans 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  
4 Property 2.8  3.6  3.9  3.0  3.7  3.4  2.7  2.6  2.6  2.7  2.9  
5 Other receivables 0.0  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  
Liabilities 0.4  0.6  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.8  0.8  0.9  1.1  1.6  
6 Non-share securities 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  
7 Credits and loans 0.1  0.2  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.6  1.0  
8 Other payables 0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.6  
Net financial wealth 3.2  3.9  4.0  3.2  4.1  4.1  3.2  3.1  3.0  3.3  2.9  
Consolidated general government 
Financial assets 36.7  37.8  30.9  22.3  19.0  17.6  14.4  15.2  14.9  15.5  14.8  
Liabilities 23.2  30.7  32.3  30.7  27.7  27.3  27.2  29.9  30.5  34.8  42.1  
Net financial wealth 13.5  7.1  -1.4  -8.5  -8.7  -9.7  -12.8  -14.7  -15.6  -19.3  -27.4  
Source: National Bank of Hungary (MNB) (2004); HUF amounts translated into euro terms on annual average exchange rates. 
Note: Government includes extra-budgetary funds, such as the Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company (ÁPV Rt), 
Government Debt Management Agency (ÁKK Rt), the Hungarian State Treasury (MÁK Rt), the National Motorway Company 
(NA Rt), other smaller companies in charge of utilising government property and some non-profit organisations. 
Consolidated data of the general government do not include receivables and payables the sub-sectors have vis-à-vis each other. 
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4. Generational accounts in Hungary 1992-2001 
 
In the following section we present the generational accounts for 2001. We will 
show our calculations under alternative tax incidence assumptions. We will 
examine the extent by which the problems related to the long-term 
sustainability of the existing tax-transfer system are attributable to the 
demographic deficit shown in the forecast, i.e. the decrease in the size of the 
population and its aging. We will also examine how generational accounts react 
to different sets of parameters, and we review Hungarian generational accounts 
in an international comparison. We will present the so-called generational 
imbalance – the main indicator of generational accounting – which arises as the 
difference between the generational accounts of newborns and future 
generations, for the period between 1992 and 2001. Additionally, using the 
example of the pension reform of 1998, we will examine how generational 
accounts (in 2001) and the generational imbalance (between 1992 and 2001) 
reacted to some changes in the welfare system. 
 
4.1 Generational accounts for 2001 
 
In Figure 4, we present the generational accounts of 2001 in two versions. The 
continuous line displays the accounts that are derived from the net tax age-
profile of the all-time base year – i.e. exclusive of pension reform components 
not that far implemented, which, will only be introduced some time in the 
future in line with the operative laws. In contrast, the dotted line shows the 
accounts including the effects of future institutional changes incorporated in the 
pension reform package (increased retirement age, new pension formula from 
2013, Swiss indexation, and eliminated degressiveness bands). Let us first 
examine the former – base case – scenario.  
As seen from Figure 4, the first section of the curve falls steeply. This is 
because the curve starts with the position of the representative agent of future 
generations (called -1 years old in the figure), and they are significant net 
contributors of over 61,200 euros per capita. The account of the 0 year-olds is 
also positive; that is to say, newborns are also net contributors to the system: on 
average they will pay almost 11,200 euros more each, calculated at 2001 values, 
than they will receive in benefits. Obviously, it would be a mistake to jump to 
the conclusion that people born now are losing out on the system of 
redistribution, since government consumption – financing pure public goods – 
is expensive, yet potentially profitable. Neither can we say that the system 
favours the older generations, because we have not taken into account the 
amounts older generations have already paid in taxes.  
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Figure 4: Generational accounts – base case and scenario with adjustment for pension 
reform, 2001 (‘000 euros) 
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The maximum of the curve for generations already alive is at the 25 year-
olds, who, during their remaining lifetime, are expected to pay 46,700 euros 
more than they will receive in benefits. This is no surprise either: typically, 25 
year-olds have already completed their schools (expensive in terms of public 
finances), are no longer eligible for orphan’s benefits, claim relatively little in 
the way of health benefits, yet have the better part of their active life ahead of 
them, during which they will pay most of their taxes. This, again, does not 
mean that 25 year-olds are so much worse off than newborns, as the past 
balances of 25 year-olds have obviously not been considered. The two groups 
could be compared only if we knew their total lifetime balances. 
The curve intersects the horizontal axis at the account of 52 year-olds. 
Accordingly, they will be net beneficiaries of the redistribution system in their 
remaining lifetime. The account of 64 year-olds is the most favourable: over 
their remaining lifetime, average members of this group will receive 22,500 
euros more than they will have paid. It is important to note that the negative 
value does not mean that 64 year-olds are dependants of society. It simply 
means that older generations have already paid most of their taxes in the earlier 
part of their lifetime, and in old age the benefits are substantially higher than 
taxes. Generational accounts are forward looking and focus on the amount 
people will pay in taxes and will claim in benefits over their remaining lifetime. 
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We also mention the values of two important indicators referred to 
earlier: those of the absolute and relative generational imbalances. Absolute 
imbalance is the difference between the accounts of newborns and future 
generations, which amounts to 50,100 euros in 2001 in the “no-pension-reform” 
scenario. This is the extra amount that future generations, expected to finance 
the deficits accumulated over the long term in the current system, have to pay 
for public services compared to the net contributions of those born now, 
assuming that the deficit can only be covered by extra taxes from future 
generations. The relative imbalance is the quotient of the two accounts minus 1, 
and gives the multiplier between the outstanding accounts of future 
generations compared to those of the newborn. This ratio is 4.5 for 2001.  
 
4.2 The impact of an institutional reform: the 1997 pension 
reform and the generational accounts for 2001 
 
With the method of generational accounting, we can measure the impact of 
changes to the institutional system on the long-term sustainability of the tax-
transfer system. One such series of changes include those components of the 
1997 pension reform that have been legislated but had not been implemented 
by 2001 in that the reform package introduced long phase-in periods for some 
components. 
One of the key components of the pension reform was to increase the 
retirement age to 62 years by 2001 for men and by 2009 for women, by one-year 
increments every two years. In simulating the change in retirement age, we 
removed employment-related contributions and pensions from the existing net 
tax profile,5 appropriately expanded the part of these profiles that corresponded 
to the period over the age of 50, and then added back the expanded profiles to 
the part of the net tax profile we had initially left intact. In practice, we assumed 
that the payment of employment-related contributions will start to decrease 
later, and that pension payments, too, will be pushed forward in time, while the 
age-profile of other contributions and benefits will remain unchanged.  
In determining the degree of the expansion, we had to take into account 
that we had handled the two genders together. Net tax profiles and pension 
profiles were not broken down by gender, so we had to calculate here with the 
average change in the retirement age. In 1998, the retirement age increased by 
one year for both genders making the combined change also one year. We 
increased all profiles accordingly by one year. In 2001, the retirement age for 
                                                 
5 In the Hungarian version of the paper we used a slightly different list of these labour-related 
taxes. The consequent changes are minor and show the effect of the pension reform slightly 
sharper. 
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men had reached its final target of 62 years, and after 2001 it is only the female 
retirement age that keeps increasing by one year in every two years.6  
Another important element of the pension reform was the introduction 
of the so-called Swiss indexation. Since 1992, annual pension increases had been 
tied to the nominal wage index. The new indexation rule, introduced after a 
brief phasing-in period takes inflation into account again, and increases the 
pensions by half of the real-wage index. This also means that the contributions 
related to employment and pensions must be handled separately, not only 
during the pension reform’s interim period, but through the entire projection. 
As with the other factors, we increased contributions from employment by the 
productivity growth rate (g), and used half of this rate to increase pensions.  
In order to bring contributions and pensions more closely tied at the 
individual level, the degressiveness bands of the pension formula – according 
to which the first HUF 10,000 of average net lifetime income has a greater 
weight in the formula than successive HUF 10,000 bands – will have to be 
phased out after a transition period of a few years. Another change is that after 
2013 gross lifetime earnings will be taken into account, rather than the 
previously applied net earnings, but the pensions calculated this way will be 
subject to income taxation. Also, the scale used to recognise the individual 
service years will be flattened out. Finally, since 1998, part of the compulsory 
pension contribution has been paid in to newly established mandatory private 
pension funds, which are not part of the general government. Accordingly, a 
part of fund members’ pensions will not be paid by the social security fund 
making expenditures of the general government decrease on the long run. We 
performed our calculations using a 6 percent contribution rate, because – 
contrary to the original concept – the increase in pension fund contributions to 8 
percent of the gross wage did not occur by 2001. If we use the 8 percent 
contribution rate in our calculations, the dotted line in Figure 4 is pushed 
somewhat lower. The impact of partial privatisation on the generational 
accounts is not as large as that of the increase in the retirement age or the 
introduction of the Swiss indexation. However, it is unique in that – by 
enhancing efficiency across the entire system – it improves the accounts of all 
age groups. Other elements of the reform foster long-term sustainability at the 
cost of currently living generations (Gál and Tarcali 2003). 
Figure 4 clearly reveals that the pension reform significantly reduces the 
generational imbalance (the difference between the accounts of the newborn 
and future generations), at the expense of already living generations. The 
starting point on the dotted line shows that an average member of a future 
                                                 
6 Gál and Tarcali (2003) calculated generational accounts separately for the pension system, 
which allowed the separate treatment of the two genders. Here, however, we cannot produce 
age-profiles for the entire tax-transfer system by gender, and this has forced us to make 
simplifications. The calculations of Gál and Tarcali cover the entire pension system, but they 
focus on the pension system only. In this study we examine the entire general government 
budget, but disregard components falling outside its scope, such as mandatory contributions 
paid to private pension funds or pension to be paid from such funds in the future. 
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generation would be a net contributor up to a ‘mere’ 39,900 euros, compared to 
the 61,200 euros if no reform is carried out. The relative imbalance falls from 4.5 
to 1.5. We can also see that the newborn generation is worse off, as their account 
surges from 11,200 euros to 16,000 euros. 
Other points on the curve basically follow the original curve, but with a 
gap that, although it varies, averages a significant 4,700 euros. The pension 
reform, thus, contributed significantly to a reduction in the generational 
imbalance, yet it places a severe additional burden on already living 
generations. We should point out some additional factors. Firstly, we are aware 
that the increased retirement age, a key component of the pension reform, has 
not materially changed the age at which people actually retire, due to the 
simultaneous introduction of early retirement. This is a factor we could not take 
into account when programming the reform, and therefore it is possible that we 
overestimate its positive effect on future generations’ accounts.  
 
4.3 Alternative tax incidence assumptions 
 
In Section 3.1.2 we showed that, in contrast with the incidence of personal 
income tax and social security contributions, there is no consensus about the 
incidence of corporate tax in the tax incidence literature. According to the first 
opinion, owners of corporate capital can partially shift corporate income tax to 
owners of non-corporate capital. According to another theory, no such shift 
may be performed. A third theory states that corporate tax is not shifted to 
other capital owners but to employees; we applied this presumption. In the 
following step we will demonstrate how generational accounts would differ if 
alternative incidence assumptions were applied. 
Corporate income tax amounts to about one quarter of personal income 
tax, and 16 percent of social security contributions. Thus it is significant enough 
to have a tangible impact on the generational accounts if it is broken down into 
payers by alternative age-profiles. The alternative age-profiles are shown in 
Figure 5. For the sake of clarity we have smoothed them out somewhat. As the 
age-profile of recipients of capital gains7 starts to decrease at a higher age and at 
a slower pace than that of employees, due to the discounting effect we expect 
that the alternative scenario of burdening the recipients of capital gains income 
with the corporate tax would decrease the generational imbalance. So the 
assumption applied as the base case showed the imbalance higher. Indeed, this 
expectation is confirmed (see Figure 6). The balance of current younger 
generations is also worse in the base case, since we charge them more in the 
present. Although, the net taxes of older generations would increase in the 
alternative scenario, and younger people, too, would pay higher taxes in the 
future, discounting reduces the impact of this. 
                                                 
7 Through this subsection we combine corporate income tax and local business tax. 
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We cannot show the difference in generational accounts in the way we 
did for pension reform, because the difference is too small compared to the 
totals of the accounts. However, it may be of worth to identify the age groups 
where alternative profiles cause the greatest variance in the balances. 
 
Figure 5: The age-profile of corporate income tax under alternative tax incidence 
assumptions, 2001, euro 
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Figure 6 shows how much worse the account of younger generations is 
under the base case assumption on incidence than it would be under the 
alternative assumption. Correspondingly the account of older people is better, 
as the elderly bear a lower net tax burden than under the alternative scenario. 
The amount of the difference is not significant in comparison with the amounts 
in the balances, although the account of 55 year-olds is smaller by almost one 
sixth in the base case. The point is, though, that even profiles with such small 
differences have an impact on the calculation of the generational imbalance.  
In another alternative calculation, we modified the incidence of duties. 
No breakdowns have been previously made for duties due to lack of input data. 
We have good reasons to assume, though, that duties payable on the transfer of 
real estate show an age-profile similar to taxes on capital gains. Although duties 
make a much smaller item than corporate tax, the profiles applied vary greatly: 
if we do not produce a breakdown, then, under the terms of equation (1), we 
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consider them to be G-items. We are likely to be closer to reality if we apply any 
of the profiles used for breakdowns for other items. 
 
Figure 6: How much larger generational accounts got that corporate tax is borne by 
employees (base case) and not recipients of capital gains income (alternative), 2001, 
euro 
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The amount of the change is not sizeable in this case either, but indicates 
that the result of the model will change if a profile is applied even to a relatively 
small item, and that the newly allocated items will not only improve the 
validity of the model, but will actually have an impact on the outcome. The 
amount of the change is smaller than in the previous case, but not by much, 
despite the fact that the amount of duties is smaller than that of the corporate 
tax. The changes are shown in Figure 7. The difference between the two 
scenarios can be seen on the vertical axis.  
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Figure 7: How much larger generational accounts would get if duties were borne by 
recipients of capital gains income (alternative) and not put among G-items (base case), 
2001, euro 
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4.4 The impact of demographic deficit  
 
Before moving on to an international comparison, we will show another 
alternative calculation. Generational accounting is sensitive to three factors: the 
budget deficit of the base year, the age structure of net tax profiles, and the 
demographic deficit, which, due to the net tax age-profiles of the base year, will 
widen the budget deficit. We show a calculation that disregards demographic 
deficit, and instead assumes that the existing structure of the population will 
continue for the next hundred years. This, of course, is not the application of 
some kind of optimistic scenario: we are only experimenting with this 
possibility. In this case the generational imbalance drops significantly for 2001; 
that is to say, future generations will barely pay more than newborns. It must 
be noted, though, that the balance of future generations is still rather high – 
almost 28,800 euros – while the balance of newborns will increase to 24,400 
euros from the original 16,000 euros. The youngest, and smallest, generations 
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would come off worst if the composition and size of the population remained 
unchanged. On the other hand, such a scenario would be especially favourable 
to large generations. 
 
Figure 8: The impact of the demographic deficit on generational accounts, 2001, euro 
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4.5 International comparison  
 
The first comparative study on generational accounting (Kotlikoff and Leibfritz, 
1999) includes calculations for 17 countries. In Table 7 below we repeat those 
accounts that appear to be most comparable to Hungary. Accordingly, the 
following countries are included in the table: Argentina, Brazil and Thailand 
(where GDP per capita is closest to Hungary’s), Portugal (which is closest in 
size), Sweden and Germany (where the level of welfare services is similar to that 
in Hungary), Italy and Japan (where, along with Germany, an accelerated aging 
of the population, similar to the Hungarian situation, is expected) and finally the 
United States. 
 The figures in the last row of the table show how much more in net taxes 
future generations will have to pay compared to those born in 1995. Hungary, 
with its 600 percent imbalance, is in the worst position of the countries in the 
table. Japan also has a serious imbalance, where the value of the index is 338 
percent, as does Italy, where it is 224 percent. 
37 
 The relative generational imbalance is not a perfect measure as such 
relative indicators depend to a large extent on the base that is on the account of 
the newborn. If it is very low, even a relatively small increase in the life-time tax 
burden appears large in comparison. In the table the accounts of Hungarian 
newborns are the lowest, even lower than those of their contemporaries in 
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Table 7: Generational accounts of selected countries in 1995 (US$ ‘000, 1995 equivalents) 
Age in 1995 US Japan Germany Italy Sweden Thailand Portugal Argentina Brazil Hungary 
70 –104,6 –44,8 –180,7 –117,5 -97,8 2,8 –42,7 -43,0 –32,9 -17,6 
60 –51,7 11,9 –183,6 –142,0 -66,4 4,8 –47,1 -39,9 –28,0 -20,4 
50 56,4 173,1 –4,2 –46,8  104,6 8,1 –10,6 -11,3 –6,3 -2,4 
40 135,6 263,8 160,1 63,4  226,5 11,8 39,7 12,6 19,7 19,1 
30 168,7 297,8 271,8 155,2  278,9 14,1 75,0 28,2 31,3 28,5 
20 159,3 257,4 313,6 186,6  265,1 13,2 82,7 30,8 27,0 27,2 
10 71,4 135,4 179,0 112,4  162,9 8,9 50,9 20,3 17,1 14,8 
0 28,5 73,0 97,1 68,4  121,8 5,9 43,5 13,9 10,2 5,7 
Future 73,9 319,4 248,8 209,9    83,8 –1,5 73,2 24,3 22,1 39,6 
Imbalance (%) 159,0 337,8 156,1 223,8 -31,2 –125,4 68,3 74,8 116,7 600,5 
Source: Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999) Table 4.2. Figures for Hungary are own calculations. 
Note: Expenditure on education is treated as a transfer broken down by cohort. Other key assumptions: productivity growth rate at 1.5 percent, 
discount rate at 5 percent.  
 
Table 8: Scaled generational accounts of selected countries in 1995 (US$ ’000, 1995 equivalents) 
Age in 1995 US Japan Germany Italy Sweden Thailand Portugal Argentina Brazil Hungary 
70 –104,6 -54,7 -242,9 -159,6 -142,4 10,0 -90,9 -139,6 -164,5 -110,1 
60 –51,7 14,5 -246,8 -192,9 -96,7 17,2 -100,2 -129,5 -140,0 -127,4 
50 56,4 211,4 -5,6 -63,6 152,3 29,0 -22,6 -36,7 -31,5 -15,1 
40 135,6 322,1 215,2 86,1 329,7 42,3 84,5 40,9 98,5 119,5 
30 168,7 363,6 365,3 210,9 406,0 50,5 159,6 91,6 156,5 178,1 
20 159,3 314,3 421,5 253,5 385,9 47,3 176,0 100,0 135,0 170,0 
10 71,4 165,3 240,6 152,7 237,1 31,9 108,3 65,9 85,5 92,6 
0 28,5 89,1 130,5 92,9 177,3 21,1 92,6 45,1 51,0 35,3 
Future 73,9 390,0 334,4 285,2 122,0 -5,4 155,7 78,9 110,5 247,0 
Imbalance 
Absolute ($) 
(%) 
 
 
45,3 
159,0 
 
 
300,9 
337,8 
 
 
203,9 
156,1 
 
 
197,1 
223,8 
 
 
-55,3 
-31,2 
 
 
-26,5 
–125,4 
 
 
63,2 
68,3 
 
 
33,8 
74,8 
 
 
59,5 
116,7 
 
 
211,8 
600,5 
Source: Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999) Table 4.2. Figures for Hungary are own calculations. 
Note: Expenditure on education is treated as a transfer broken down by cohort. Other key assumptions: productivity growth rate at 1.5 percent, 
discount rate at 5 percent. Scale: the individual present values multiplied by (GDP per capita in relevant country/ GDP per capita in US). 
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Thailand. Because of this, it is worth calculating the absolute imbalance, too, i.e. 
the difference between the tax burden of those born now and in the future. 
Since this indicator is significantly distorted by the difference in the dollar’s 
purchasing power in the various countries, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999) re-
scaled the absolute index of the imbalance. The variance between the tax 
burdens of the 0 year-old and future generations was multiplied for each 
country by the difference between the GDP per capita of the US and the country 
in question. The resulting index expresses how great the generational imbalance 
would be in dollar terms, if we disregarded the differences in purchasing 
power. Table 8 presents the results of Kotlikoff and Leibfritz for the countries 
listed above, which we have supplemented with Hungarian figures of our own 
calculations. 
 If we filter out the differences in purchasing power across countries, the 
Hungarian generational imbalance is still serious, but it does not seem quite 
that dramatic any more. Although the imbalance in percentage terms remains 
the same by definition, future generations have to pay similar levels of 
additional tax as their German and Italian contemporaries, while their relative 
situation is substantially better than that of their contemporaries in Japan. 
Nevertheless, apart from Hungary, no other emerging economy assumes such 
an amount of burden to be met by future generations. 
It must be noted that the data in this international comparison are outdated (the 
separate European comparison prepared on behalf of the European 
Commission also used data from 1995), and significant changes have occurred 
in many countries in the tax-transfer system. 
 
4.6 A time series of generational imbalance  
 
Generational accounts can also be examined over a period of time. Since we 
have prepared the net tax profiles for each year between 1992 and 2001, we can 
perform a separate generational accounting exercise for each year as a base 
year. Below, we present the generational imbalances calculated in this way. We 
present these calculations in ECU/euro terms to offset the impact of Hungarian 
forint inflation. We have run the calculation with the appropriate dollar 
exchange rates as well, and, apart from minor differences, have received the 
same result. Similarly, we calculated the number of monthly net average wages 
that made up the absolute generational imbalance in the particular year. The 
trend of this index, too, is similar to the curve of the absolute imbalance in euro 
terms. 
Figure 9 presents generational imbalances in euro terms, calculated for 
the period 1992 to 2001. The figure clearly draws the political cycle. The 
significant jump in the generational imbalance exceeds the immediate budget 
deficit.  
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Figure 9: Absolute generational imbalance in Hungary, 1992-2001, in ‘000 ECU/euro 
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On the other hand, a similarly substantial improvement occurred 
following the austerity measures introduced by then finance minister, Lajos 
Bokros. After the introduction of the austerity measures in 1995, the imbalance 
already showed a significant decrease of 14,000 euros per capita, to be reduced 
by an additional 14,500 euros in the following year. When considering that 
finding, we must appreciate that generational accounting – being an accounting 
and not an economic method – does not calculate with behavioural reactions, 
and thus it disregards impacts on individual choices on savings, employment 
and fertility. 
In Figure 9 we also present the time-series of imbalances by 
incorporating future steps of the pension reform. There is a major improvement 
in the imbalance: in each year, the index decreased by 20,000-26,000 euros 
compared to the no reform scenario (although in 2000-2001 this partly due to 
the revaluation of the forint to the euro). This is the case even though some of 
the positive impacts of reform were already being felt in the net tax age-profiles 
towards the end of the period under review.  
We must note here that the pension reform is probably a rare exception, 
in that we incorporated the changes into the model’s calculation algorithm. 
Typically, we examine the impacts of various institutional changes by 
41 
estimating the impact of a particular change or measure on the net tax profile, 
and we use this new net tax profile in the projection.  
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